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COMPARISON EVIDENCE IN
OBSCENITY TRIALS
Marguerite Munson Lentz*
"[S]ex and obscenity are not synonomous": 1 sexually explicit
material is obscene only when it tends to incite shameful or lustful thoughts and thus appeals to the prurient interest.2 A critical
constitutional distinction exists between such obscene matter
and portrayals of sex which do not appeal to the prurient interest. While nonprurient sexual depictions enjoy full first amendment freedoms, 8 the purveyor of obscene material cannot claim
the protections of the first amendment;' and indeed may be subject to state or federal prosecution for violating obscenity
statutes. 15
• Associate, Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, Detroit, Michigan. B.A., 1976, J.D.
1979, University of Michigan. I wish to thank Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy, and Professors Carl E. Schneider and Richard Lempert of the University of Michigan Law School
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
2. See id. at 485, 486-87 & n.20; State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 458-60, 591 P.2d
546, 550-52, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 49 (1960).
3. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 488.
4. Id. at 486-87.
5. While possession of obscenity in the home is constitutionally protected, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1968), the seller or distributor of obscenity may be prosecuted. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. at 484-85). Federal statutes prohibit the mailing or carrying through interstate
commerce of obscene materials, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1976), or the importation of
obscene materials, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 1981).
Most jurisdictions prohibit the sale or distribution of obscene materials. See Au.
CooE §§ 13-7-162, -191 (1975); ARlz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3502 (1978); .ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-3553 (1977); CAL. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 311.2 (West 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-7-103
(1978) (but see People v. New Horizons, Inc., 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980) (Colorado statute is unconstitutionally overbroad)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-194 (1972); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1361 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-200l(a)(l) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 847.07 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 712-1214 (1976);
IDAHO CoDE § 18-4103 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND.
CoDE § 35-30-10.1-2 (Supp. 1979); lowA CODE ANN. § 728.4 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4301 (Supp. 1979); Kv. REv. STAT. §§ 531.030, .060 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:106.A.(3) (West Supp. 1980); MD. CRIM. LAw CODE ANN. § 418 (Supp. 1981); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.343a (1970);
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 617.241 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 97-29-39 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 573.020-.030 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813 (1978); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 201.249 (1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 650.2 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:34-2 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-2 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§

45

46

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

The Supreme Court, in Miller v. California, 8 fashioned a
three-part obscenity test which reflects this distinction.7 A work
235.05-.06 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-27.1-01 (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1040.13 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Oa. REV. STAT. § 167.087 (1979); PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5903 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4074 (Supp.
1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1 (Supp. 1980) (but see D & J. Enterprises, Inc. v.
Michaelson, 401 A.2d 440 (R.I. 1979) (Rhode Island statute is unconstitutionally overbroad)); S.C. CODE § 16-15-320 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3004 (Supp. 1981);
Tux. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.23 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 7610-1204 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802 (1974); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1024
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE§ 18.2-374 (1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 9.68.060 (1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 944.21(1)(a) (West 1958); WYO. STAT. § 6-5-304 (1977). Three states prohibit the sale or distribution of obscene materials to minors, but have no restrictions for
adults. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2911 (Supp. 1981-1982); Mom. CODE ANN.§
45-8-20l(l)(a) (1979); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8A-2 (1977). South Dakota prohibits the sale or
distribution of obscene materials to minors, S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-24-28 (1979), but
explicitly permits such sales to adults, id. § 22-24-36. Alaska has no restrictions on the
sale or distribution of obscene materials.
6. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
7. Id. at 24. For discussion about the development and substance of obscenity law,
see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831-47
(1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-16 (1978).
The Miller test reformulates earlier standards having their roots in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), which were promulgated by a plurality of the Court in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Under the Roth-Memoirs test, sexually
explicit material would be obscene if: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeal[edJ to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material was patently offensive
because it affront[ed] contemporary community standards relating to the description of
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material [was) utterly without redeeming
social value." Id. at 418. Many lower courts, with later approval from the Supreme
Court, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977), relied upon the RothMemoirs test. See, e.g., United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1976); Huffman
v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 455 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913
(1973); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md.
App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971); State v. Blair, 32 Ohio St. 2d 237,291 N.E.2d 451 (1972),
vacated, 413 U.S. 905 (1973).
Miller departed most significantly from the Roth-Memoirs formulation by relaxing the
requirement that obscene material be "utterly without redeeming social value." Yet the
same three basic elements of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and l~ck of social
value must be present under either test for the material to be obscene, and both Miller
and Roth-Memoirs require that contemporary community standards provide the ultimate rule of decision. See Benjoya, Zisson & LaCroix, Obscenity: The New Law and Its
Enforcement-Two Views, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1973); Shugrue & Zeig, An Atlas
for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 157, 176 (19731974). Thus, any discussion of the admissability of comparison evidence in cases using
the Roth-Memoirs standards, see, e.g., United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.),
vacated, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971), is
applicable to later cases applying the Miller test. Furthermore, the Miller standards apply to federal as well as state obscenity prosecutions, see United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973); thus this Article draws upon cases dealing with
both federal and state obscenity statutes.
Persons indicted for conduct occurring before Miller are entitled to all the benefits
which Miller might confer, as well as the application ofthe Roth-Memoirs "utterly with-
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will be adjudged obscene only if it (1) appeals to the prurient

interest of the average person applying contemporary community standards,8 (2) is a patently offensive depiction of sexual
conduct which has been proscribed by statute, and (3) is devoid
of any serious social value. 9 The concept of "community stanout redeeming value" standard. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1977);
United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir. 1979). See generally Project, An
Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity,
52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 810, 825-57 (1977) (discussing the history of the Supreme Court decisions from Roth to Miller).
Not every court would agree that a prurient, patently offensive work should be considered nonobscene merely because socially valuable. In Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg, 571
P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court pressed the point with particular zeal:
It would appear that [the] argument [that a work must lack serious social value
to be obscene] ought only to be advanced by depraved, mentally deficient, mindwarped queers. Judges who seek to find technical excuses to permit such pictures to be shown under the pretense of finding some intrinsic value to it are
reminiscent of a dog that returns to his vomit in search of some morsel in the
filth which may have some redeeming value to his own taste.
Id. at 1299-300.
8. Prurient appeal is measured by the impact on the average adult rather than on a
child, cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1978)(error to instruct that children are part of the relevant community if no evidence is in the record that material was
intended for children or that defendant believed children would likely receive the material), or on a person particularly sensitive or insensitive to prurient appeal, provided the
material is directed to the public at large. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
But the jury properly may consider the sensitive along with the insensitive in assessing
prurient interest. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. at 298-300.
li sexually explicit material is directed at a special group rather than the public at
large, the appeal to the prurient interest of a member of that group rather than of the
average adult will be the relevant standard for determining obscenity. See Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966); United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp.
350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 216, 273 A.2d 436, 445
(1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super.·102, 120, 245 A.2d 495, 505 (1968), reu'd on
other grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). Materials which may be obscene if directed to the
public at large may not be obscene if directed to the medical community. See United
States v. Nicholas, 97 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v. One Package, 86
F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1936); Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473, 474 (6th Cir. 1933);
Commonwealth v. Landis, 8 Phila. 453, 454-55 (Phila. Pa. Quart. Sess. 1870). See also
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2 (arguing for a variable concept of obscenity dependent upon the appeal to and the effect upon the target audience).
9. Sexually oriented work is not obscene unless all three elements of the Miller test
are satisfied. An offensive work, even when appealing to the prurient interest, will nonetheless be constitutionally protected if socially valuable. See, e.g., United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65, 71 (1st Cir.) (holding the work Anal and Oral Loue nonobscene
because not utterly lacking in social value, even though the dominant theme was prurient and the work's discussion may have exceeded national standards in its offensiveness),
vacated, 413 U.S. 916 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 233
· A.2d 840 (1967) (reversing obscenity conviction for sale of Candy because the book had
some social value), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968).
·
Likewise, an offensive work without social value that lacks appeal to the prurient interest will not be obscene. See, e.g., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 164-65 (2d Cir.
1965); Penthouse lnt'l Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2284 (N.D. Ga. May
15, 1981); People v. Biocic, 80 lli. App. 2d 65, 70, 224 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1967); Cohen,
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dards" thus forms the heart of the obscenity test: these standards explicitly measure whether a work appeals to the prurient
interest and implicitly define a work's offensiveness.10 A vital element, therefore, of a defense to obscenity charges would be a
demonstration that the material at issue did not transgress contemporary community standards, in terms of both offensiveness
and appeal to the prurient interest. 11
Consider the example of Larry Flynt, well-known publisher of
Hustler and Chic magazines. 12 Flynt, prosecuted in Atlanta for
selling those magazines, was found guilty on eleven counts of
distributing obscene materials.13 The prosecution presented its
Obscenity Cases: Anatomy of a Winning Defense, 14 CruM. L. BULL. 225 (1978).
Furthermore, a work, though a valueless piece appealing to the prurient interest, will
not be obscene if not patently offensive. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161
(1974); Huffman v. United States, 502 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The "patently
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct [must be] specifically defined by the regulating state
law, as written or construed." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). See, e.g., State
v. Tara Enterprises, Inc., 202 Neb. 260, 274 N.W.2d 875 (1979) (reversing obscenity con•
viction because magazine content did not fall within definitions proscribed by statute).
For an example of a state obscenity statute proscribing fewer sexually explicit depictions
than may constitutionally be forbidden, see lowA CODE ANN.§ 728.4 (West 1979) (forbidding only the sale of material depicting sadomasochistic abuse, excretory functions, sex
with children, or bestiality).
In addition to the requirement that all three prongs of the Miller test be satisfied,
prurient appeal and social value must be determined by considering the material as a
whole rather than in isolated parts. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957);
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936). Parts condemned by an obscenity
statute, however, are considered separately when wholly unrelated to the rest of the
work. See, e.g., Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam) ("A quotation
from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication . . . ."); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.) (obscene
photos were not redeemed by being bound together with unrelated textual material),
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine
"Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 498 (D. Md. 1966) (written portions termed "secondary"
because unrelated to the offensive illustrations), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50
(1967). But see State v. Walden Book Co., 386 So. 2d 345 (La. 1980) (finding an issue of
Penthouse magazine nonobscene because a number of articles had literary or social
value, although dissent argued that the articles comprised only 67 pages and were totally
unrelated to 96 pages of obscene materials}.
10. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977).
11. This may not be the only available line of defense. The defendant might also try
to show that the material at issue has serious social value or that another element of the
crime, such as scienter, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-54 (1959), is lacking. If
other avenues are foreclosed, however, the defendant will have no choice but to attempt
to show that the material in question does not transgress contemporary community standards. See id. at 164-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (evidence of community standards
"goes to the very essence of the defense and therefore to the constitutional safeguards of
due process").
12. Flynt claims a national readership of 12 to 15 million for his magazines. Associated Press Newswire Report, March 26, 1979.
13. See Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, 672, stay of enforce·
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case-in-chief merely by introducing into evidence eight copies of
Hustler and three copies of Chic; no witnesses were called. 14
Flynt's defense consisted in part of various attempts to demonstrate that Hustler was not obscene by contemporary community standards. As evidence of those standards, he proferred an
opinion poll, sales records of Hustler, numerous comparison exhibits bearing a "reasonable resemblance" 115 to Hustler and Chic,
and the testimony of an expert and a public librarian regarding
sexually explicit material available in the area. The trial court,
_however, rejected all these attempts to demonstrate that Flynt's
magazines did not transgress contemporary community standards on obscenity. 18
Comparison evidence, such as the magazines similar to Hus- ·
tler and Chic assembled by Flynt, is "[o]ne of the most often
attempted and most rarely successful methods of presenting evidence of contemporary community standards."17 As the term
suggests, comparison evidence is proferred for the jury to comment denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980). Flynt received a suspended jail sentence and was fined
$27,500. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, § 1, at 18, col. 3.
14. Several expert witnesses were called by the State in rebuttal on the obscenity
question. Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 232, 264 S.E.2d at 672.
15. Id. at 239, 264 S.E.2d at 676.
16. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, did not rule that the
proffered evidence of community standards never would be admissible, but held the trial
court had not abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. Id. at 237-43, 264 S.E.2d at
675-78.
17. Id. at 249, 264 S.E.2d at 681 (Dean, C.J., concurring) (quoting F. SCHAUER, THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY 133 (1976)); see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-27 (1974).
In addition to comparison evidence, prevailing community standards could be demonstrated through the use of surveys, expert testimony, or other means. See, e.g., id.;
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Schauer, Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 377, 388 (1975).
This Article will not address the use of experts or surveys in obscenity trials. For a
discussion of the problems involved in using experts, see Brigman, The Controversial
Role of the Expert in Obscenity Litigation, 7 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 519 (1978); Frank, Obscenity: Some Problems of Values and the Use of Experts, 41 WASH. L. REv. 631 (1966);
McGaffey, A Realistic Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.
218 (1974); Stem, Toward a Rationale for the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity
Litigation, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 527 (1969); Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1966); Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113. Survey evidence as a means for presenting community standards in obscenity trials is assessed in Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 232-33,
264 S.E.2d at 672; People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410 N.E.2d 476 (1980); Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1220-22 (Mass. 1978); Brigman, supra, at 544
(suggesting properly executed survey evidence avoids the pitfalls of comparison evidence); Beckett & Bell, Community Standards: Admitting a Public Opinion Poll Into
Euidence in an Obscenity Case, CASE & COMMENT, March-April 1979, at 18; Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202 (1977); Fahringer, The Defense of an
Obscenity Prosecution, TmAL, May 1978, at 32; Lamont, Public Opinion Polls and Suruey Evidence in Obscenity Cases, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 135 (1972-1973).

50

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

pare with the material directly at issue. For example, Flynt's attorney claimed that if the jurors had been permitted to view the
proferred comparison exhibits, which sold 1.3 million copies in
the county during the six-month period covered by Flynt's indictments, they would have recognized that Hustler and Chic
did not overstep contemporary community standards.18
Flynt's inability to introduce comparison evidence is a common though not typical experience. Courts have varied markedly
in their treatment of comparison evidence: 19 some have admitted
it;20 some have excluded it;21 some have reversed lower courts for
18. See Harris, Publisher Larry Flynt Has a Tough Week in Atlanta Court, Washington Post, March 25, 1979, at A6, col. 1. The Georgia Court of Appeals found the
excluded comparison evidence to be similar to the copies of Chic and Hustler at issue.
Nonetheless, it upheld the trial court's exclusion of these .exhibits because Flynt's proferred evidence 9f sales figures for the comparison exhibits was not the best evidence. Although Flynt had shown that the comparison exhibits were distributed to 324 retail outlets in the county, the court found this demonstrated availability rather than the
requisite community acceptance. Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. at 239-43, 264 S.E.2d at
676-78.
While obscenity defendants commonly make proffers of comparison evidence, prosecutors might also wish to introduce comparison exhibits to illustrate sexually explicit material considered obscene by the community. See, e.g., People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 2d 84, 86,
480 P.2d 633, 634, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833, 834, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); Lockhart &
McClure, supra note 2, at 26 (Solicitor General in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S: 476
(1957), presented the Court with a carton containing hard-core pornographic materials).
. 19. See United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir.) ("There has been a
considerable amount of confusion in the courts as to the admissibility and function of
· comparison evidence in obscenity cases. Some jurisdictions have held it reversible error
to reject such evidence, while others exclude it rather summarily."), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1022 (1974)..
.
20. See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962); United States v. Oakley, 290 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 888
(1961); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1956), atf'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill.
1975); United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D.D.C. 1970), vacated and re•
manded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 914 (1973); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine
"Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495-96 (D. Md. 1966), atf'd, 373 F.2d 633 {4th Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50
(1967); United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1963), atf'd, 338 F.2d
12 (3d Cir. 1964), atf'd, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 199,
410 N.E.2d 476, 479 (1980); People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768, 772-73, 174
N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (1958); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 105, 447 P.2d 304, 310-11 (1968),
cert. d1_mied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969).
21. See United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Thevis, 490 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Van Gundy v. United
States, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Jacobs, 433
F.2d 932, 933 {9th Cir. 1970); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 659 {9th Cir. 1970),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973); Books, Inc. v. United
States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967);
Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U;S. 859
(1961); Schindler v. United States, 208 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
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refusing to admit it; 22 some have suggested it never is admissible.23 Moreover, the courts' reasoning has been as disparate as
their conclusions. A few courts have admitted comparison evidence without discussion,u while many others have summarily
excluded it.211 Some find comparison evidence relevant if freely
available in the community,28 yet other courts have argued that
U.S. 938 (1954); Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 482-83, 296 So. 2d 218, 226-27 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); Matheny v. State, 55 Ala. App. 119, 123-24, 313 So. 2d 547,
550 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982 (1976); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 81, 205
S.E.2d 119, 121 (1974); State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 372-73, 192 N.W.2d 421, 424-25
(1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super. 102, 121, 245 A.2d 495, 506 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969); State v. Blair, 32 Ohio St. 2d 237, 239-40, 291 N.E.2d
451, 454 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905 (1973); City of Sioux Falls v.
Mini-Kota Art Theatres, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 676, 678-79 (S.D. 1976); State v. J-R Distribs.,
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 644, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974).
22. See In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879,366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961); People v.
Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830, (1979); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md.
App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962); State
ex rel. Leis v. William S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 342 (1975); Berg
v. State, 599 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) (error to exclude some exhibits while allowing other comparison exhibits to be admitted).
23. See United States v. One Reel of 35mm. Color Motion Picture Film, 491 F.2d
956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959),
aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); People v. Finkelstein, 11
N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661 (1962); State v. Tidyman, 30 Ore. App. 537, 568 P.2d 666,
(1977). One prosecutor has suggested that, as a practical matter, comparison evidence
rarely will be admissible in an obscenity trial. See Cartolano, The Hustler Trial: Two
Opinions on the Use of Comparative Evidence in Determining Community Standards
in Obscenity Litigation: The Prosecution, 4 N. Kv. L. REV. 195 199-200 (1977).
24. See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962); United States v. Oakley, 290 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
888 (1961); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1956), atf'd, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 566-67, 446 P.2d 535, 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969); People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410
N.E.2d 476 (1980); People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 N.Y. Misc. 2d 768, 174 N.Y.S. 813
(1958) (admitted material already adjudicated nonobscene); State v. Horn, 18 N.C. App.
377, 197 S.E.2d 274 (1973), atf'd, 285 N.C. 82, 203 S.E.2d 36, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974
(1974).
.
25. See United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Thevis, 490 F.2d 7.6, 77 (5th Cir. 1974) ("If expert testimony is not required to
determine obscenity, it is certainly within the trial judge's discretion not to allow comparable evidence."), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 801 (1975); United States v. Jacobs, 433 F.2d
932, 933 (9th Cir. 1970); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1100 (9th
Cir. 1974); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 205 S.E.2d 119 (1974).
26. See United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. ID. 1975); In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961) (error
to exclude either comparison evidence of materials already adjudicated nonobscene or
comparable books and publications sold in community); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223,
229-30, 182 A.2d 798, 802 (1962) (error to exclude books on sale in the community that
were proffered as comparison exhibits); Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 220-21, 273
A.2d 436, 447 (1971) (abuse of discretion to exclude, for comparison purposes, newspapers and magazines circulating freely in the area).
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mere availability of the exhibits has no relevance to assessing
whether a particular work is obscene. 27 Still other courts have
found countervailing factors, such as the desire to avoid either
cumulative evidence28 or jury confusion,29 sufficiently persuasive
to justify excluding relevant comparison evidence. A more recent
approach, based upon the formulation set forth in United States
v. Womack, 30 assesses the relevancy of comparison evidence
based upon its similarity to the materials in question and its acceptability to the community. 31
27. See United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
947 (1971); Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966) ("It is, of
course, true that what is sold in the market reflects to some extent community standards. But it is not true that every item sold is necessarily not obscene. Hence, not every
book in the market is admissible to test the obscenity of Lust Job."), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860
(6th Cir.) ("[T]he establishment of a fait accompli by the purveyors of pornography is
[not] proof that they have already succeeded in destroying every remaining standard of
our contemporary society. Nor has that society endowed these men with the right to
establish our standards. License to continue does not follow each victory in spreading
obscenity."), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388
U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881, 882 (immaterial to prosecution whether other persons were violating any laws, legal or moral, or were selling obscene literature), aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Matheny v. State, 313 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982
(1976); State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 647, 126 N.W.2d 858, 862-63 (1964) (other
materials are not necessarily acceptable merely because not selected for prosecution);
People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 183 N.E.2d 661, 663-64, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371
(1962) (fact that publications were seen in bookstores does not indicate that the books
were sold or read). But see State v. Short, 368 So. 2d 1078, 1082 (La.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 884 (1979) (that evidence of availability does not itself prove acceptability or tolerance is an argument addressed to the weight, not the admissibility, of such evidence).
28. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 1966),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967);
Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975);
People v. Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1979).
29. See Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd per
curiam on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 702, 198 So.
2d 889, 895-96 (1967), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); State v.
Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971); State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J.
Super. 102, 121-22, 245 A.2d 495, 506 (1968) (introducing materials already adjudicated
nonobscene would make trial unmanageably complex), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). See generally I J. WmMORE, EvlDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 29a (3d ed. 1940); Cady, Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L.
REV. 333, 344 (1967).
30. 509 F.2d 368, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961)), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975).
31. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 293, on remand, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403-04 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Jacobs, 433 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gower, 316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395
(D.D.C. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 914 (1973); United
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Although the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to find
comparison evidence never admissible, in Hamling v. United
States 32 it approved various arguments commonly cited as rationales for excluding comparison evidence. In Hamling, the trial
court had rejected defendant's proffer of two types of comparison evidence: material that had been found constitutionally protected speech in previous litigation, and material openly available at newsstands.33 The Court found no abuse of discretion in
the exclusion of either type of evidence - the comparison exhibits were not necessarily relevant merely because readily available or previously adjudicated nonobscene. Even assuming the
relevance of the exhibits, however, the Court found their exclusion to be justified by the possibly confusing effects upon the
jury. Furthermore, the Court argued that any error in the exclusion of comparison evidence was rendered harmless by the opportunity to present expert evidence regarding prevailing community standards. 34
This Article critiques the approach endorsed in Hamling, particularly regarding the Court's failure to consider how the presentation of proof in an obscenity trial affects the defendant's
constitutional rights. The Article urges that relevant comparison
evidence should be admissible despite the risk of confusion or
States v. 392 Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd,
373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds su.b nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp.
171, 195-99 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855,860 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam
on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Pierce v. State,
292 Ala. 473, 483, 296 So. 2d 218, 227 (1974) (evidence on community standards must be
admitted upon establishment of a proper foundation); Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232,
235-37, 264 S.E.2d 669, 674, stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980); State v.
Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971); City of Sioux Falls v. MiniKota Art Theatres, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 676, 679 (S.D. 1976); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82
Wash. 2d 584, 647, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 947 (1974).
32. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). With the exception of Hamling, the Supreme Court has not
considered directly the extent to which evidence may be admitted or excluded in an
obscenity trial. The issue was raised in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), but the
majority declined to address the question - although Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
would have ruled it error to exclude all proffered evidence of community standards. Id.
at 164-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Similarly, in Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 304-05 (1978),
the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals the question of admissibility of comparison
evidence. See United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.) (applying the Womack test for admissibility on remand), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
33. The defendant in Hamling also proffered as evidence of community standards
materials which had received second-class mailing privileges. The Court rejected this
proffer, however, reasoning that the receipt of special mailing privileges had no bearing
on determining community standards because postal inspectors have no power of censorship. See 418 U.S. at 126.
34. Id. at 124-27.
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the opportunity to present expert testimony, and furthermore,
that a court should be required to make explicit its findings regarding the relevancy of comparison evidence. Part I of the Article demonstrates the constitutional significance to the obscenity
defendant of evidence, particularly comparison exhibits, bearing
on prevailing community standards. Part II considers the assessment of the relevancy of comparison evidence and the need for
written evaluation from a trial court excluding comparison evidence as irrelevant. Finally, part III argues that countervailing
factors normally should not be considered sufficiently weighty to
justify exclusion of relevant comparison evidence.
I. THE

IMPORTANCE OF COMPARISON EVIDENCE TO PROTECTING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE OBSCENITY DEFENDANT

A.

Community Standards and Due Process

Due process requires that a defendant be presumed innocent
unless the prosecution has proved every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 311 In an obscenity prosecution, there35. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Three different burdens of proof are present in any criminal jury trial: (1) the burden
of pleading the issue; (2) the burden of producing evidence on the issue; and (3) the
burden of persuading the jury. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 171-73
(1969). While the burden of pleading is a mere formality, id. at 172, the burden of production requires a party to come forward with evidence sufficient to support a finding on
a particular issue. If the party having the burden of production fails to produce sufficient
evidence, the court takes the issue from the jury and rules against that party. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases;
86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977). In the obscenity case, neither party has the burden
- other than that placed upon the prosecution to introduce the allegedly obscene materials into evidence - to produce evidence regarding the three elements of the Miller
obscenity test. The jury may decide questions of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, or
social value without benefit of any evidence other than the material at issue. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953
(1966); notes 38-42 and accompanying text infra. Thus, in an obscenity trial, the only
important burden of proof is that of persuasion: the burden of convincing the jury to the
required degree of certainty.
For a brief historical background of the presumption of innocence, see Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior
To Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 441, 459-65.
This Article will not consider whether the definition of obscenity denies due process by
being unconstitutionally vague, except insofar as the difficulties in admitting comparison
evidence suggest community standards to be an unworkable concept. See pt. III infra.
The Supreme Court has held the definition of obscenity not to be unconstitutionally
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fore, the material at issue must be shown beyond a reasonable
doubt to satisfy all three prongs of the Miller test; 38 a defendant
cannot be convicted on obscenity charges if the jury has reasonable doubt whether the work in question transgresses contemporary community standards. 37 The Supreme Court held in Hamling v. United States, 36 however, that the prosecution in an
obscenity case need not introduce evidence other than the material in question to prove a violation of community standards.39
vague in various contexts. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977) (Illinois obscenity
statute); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (federal obscenity statute). But see
Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v.
Carter, 388 So. 2d 802, 803-04 (La. 1980) (statute prohibiting lewd dancing or pictures is
unconstitutionally vague under Miller standards). For a discussion on the vagueness of
the obscenity standard, see Gelhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures, and Dreadful
Laws, 8 GA. L. REV. 291 (1974); Comment, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1277, 1288-90 (1978) (Supreme Court's specificity requirement
satisfies first amendment and due process); Case Comment, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391,
400-03 (1976).
36. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
37. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
38. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
39. Id. at 100; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); United
States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977);
United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.) ("[t]he government may rely
upon inferences [from the allegedly -obscene material placed in evidence] to support a
finding of obscenity"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); United States v. Groner, 479
F.2d 577, 584 (5th Cir.) ("[t]he pictures, books, publications or other materials involved
may serve as evidence to contradict the opinion of the expert"), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.
1965) ("[t]he jury had before it only the labels, the advertisements, the phonograph
records and record jackets" which were the subject of the obscenity prosecution), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966). The jury's finding of obscenity is a permissible inference
rather than a presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 585 (5th
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973). But see Ashford &
Risinger, supra note 35, at 201 (jurors are strongly disposed to find inferences asserted
by the prosecution, thus making a permissible inference equivalent to a presumption).
The Supreme Court has reserved judgment as to whether expert testimony would be
required where contested materials are directed at a bizarre deviant group whose tastes
are outside the jury's experience. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303 (1978);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973). Two lower courts have suggested that expert evidence should be introduced, even though not generally necessary,
when the material is too "esoteric" for the jury. See United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155,
166 (2d Cir. 1965) ("What stirs the lust of the sexual deviate requires evidence of special
competence.") (quoting Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 539 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), vacated, 357 U.S. 346 (1958)); United States v. 392
Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 493 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633
(4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); cf. People v. Wiener, 91 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 154 Cal. Rptr.
110, 113 (1979) (court would not require expert evidence for materials dealing with
pedophilia or bestiality because there was no demonstration that the materials were
aimed at deviant groups); Gotlieb v. State, 406 A.2d 270, 278 (Del. Super. 1979) (the
materials at issue were "not so unusually bizarre or arcane as to transcend the realm of
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Rather, the prosecution could proffer only the putatively obscene material;' 0 leaving the jury to apply the Miller test based
upon its own knowledge of prevailing standards in the community. 41 The Court assumed that the jury, being competent to determine the course followed by the "reasonable man,"42 likewise
could gauge the content of prevailing community standards. In
making this assumption, the Court appears to have entrusted
the jury with a Herculean task.
Contrary to the Court's reasoning, the nature of the inquiry
into community standards differs fundamentally from questions
involving the reasonable man. While questions of reasonableness
and community norms both draw upon objective standards
rather than jurors' subjective beliefs, reasonable man principles
are based upon abstract, idealistic notions, while community
standards are gleaned from concrete attitudes of specific people.
The reasonable man standard does not depend upon what people actually think or do; people do not necessarily think or act
reasonably. 43 Community standards, in contrast, are considered
tangible criteria dependent upon actual views held by specific
people - including the "sensitive and the insensitive" - so to
reflect "the collective view" of everyone in the community."" Unless a consensus exists regarding community acceptance of sexuthe jury's experience").
40. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973) ("Simply stated,
hard core pornography ... can and does speak for itself.") (quoting United States v.
Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971)); Flynt v. State,
153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980).
41. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974) ("A juror is entitled to
draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or
vicinage from which he comes for making the required determination •••."). Various
courts have perceived the jury as the embodiment of the community, thus obviating the
need for any independent evidence regarding the views of that community. See, e.g.,
United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 184 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th
Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.
447 (1967); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App. 3d 58, 66, 337 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1975); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 559, 62 N.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1945); City of Duluth v.
State, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979).
42. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
43. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 151 (4th ed. 1971)
("The courts have gone to unusual pains to emphasize the abstract and hypothetical
character of this mythical [reasonable] person. He is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and
careful man, who is always up to standard.").
44. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) ("the community includes all
adults who constitute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant community standards").
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ally oriented material - a highly unlikely prospect" 5 - the jury
cannot know community standards without knowing the views
held by all members of the community." 8 Considering that the
relevant community may be boundless, or as far-ranging as an
entire state, this task borders on the impossible unless specific
evidence is introduced to reflect those standards."7
45. Several studies and commentators reject the possibility for a community consensus on obscenity. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 17, at 1205-06; Dennison, The Hustler Trial:
Two Opinions on the Use of Comparative Evidence in Determining Community Standards in Obscenity Litigation: The Defense, 4 N. Kv. L. REv. 200, 221-22 (1977); Wallace, Obscenity and Contemporary Community Standards: A Survey, J. Soc. ISSUES,
Autumn 1973, at 53; Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 591 (1977); Wilson & Abelson, Experience With and
Attitudes Toward Explicit Sexual Materials, J. Soc. ISSUES, Autumn 1973, at 19.
46. Furthermore, the jury would need to know the views of most members of the
community even to determine if a consensus existed.
47. The Supreme Court has rejected as too abstract a national "community" standard for measuring obscenity, but has declined to specify a smaller geographic unit as
constituting the appropriate community for purposes of applying the Miller test. Thus
the jury may apply contemporaneous community standards without any specified geographic boundary. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-05 (1974); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 22
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); State v. Schwartz, 199 Neb. 17, 255 N.W.2d
859 (1977); Hunt v. State, 601 P.2d 464, 469 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
Although the national standard indeed may be overly abstract, the concept of community standards seemingly makes little sense unless the community's bounds are defined.
But see United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d at 22 ("The geographical limits of the
community need not be defined when dealing with 'the average person applying contemporary community standards'."). Therefore, specifying a geographic area as the relevant
community is constitutionally permissible, though not constitutionally required. See
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 157;
City of Tacoma v. Duane, 15 Wash. App. 698, 552 P.2d 1068 (1976). Many jurisdictions
have responded by specifying the state as the relevant community. See, e.g., Pierce v.
State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); State v.
Cimino, 33 Conn. Sup. 680, 366 A.2d 1168 (1976); Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 205
S.E.2d 119 (1974); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App. 3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975); United
States Mfg. & Distrib. Corp. v. City of Great Falls, 169 Mont. 298, 546 P.2d 522 (1976).
Others define the relevant standard by reference to local commQDities. See, e.g., United
States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 188
(1977); United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); People v. Austin, 76 Mich. App. 455, 257 N.W.2d 120 (1977); Parrish v. State,
521 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978).
For purposes of various federal statutes, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) (mailing obscene
matter prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976) (interstate transport of obscene matter prohibited); 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) (importation of obscene matter prohibited), obscenity is defined by local and not statewide community standards. See Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 306 (1977). Interstate transportation of obscene matter may be
prosecuted under local standards at the place of departure, see, e.g., United States v.
Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977) (obscenity of imported material determined by standards of place of entry, not ultimate destination), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978);
United States v.· Mohney, 476 F. Supp. 421, 426 (D. Hawaii 1979), the place of destination, see, e.g., United States v. Linetsky, 533 P.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
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Furthermore, even assuming that jurors might have an accurate perception of prevailing attitudes, their application of community standards may well be distorted. Justice Stevens has
suggested that a juror viewing sexually explicit material will
often react differently in the social context of a jury room than if
the material were viewed in a purely private setting.48
Without relevant evidence demonstrating prevailing community standards, the jury cannot avoid making a personal reaction
to sexually explicit material,49 thus contravening the constituSlepicoff, 524 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Schauer,
supra note 17; Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Obscenity
Proceedings: The Role of the Constitution and 'the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REv. 399
(1978); Comment, Federal Obscenity Prosecutions; Dirty Dealing with the First Amendment, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 720 (1978); Note, Postal Obscenity Prosecutions After
Miller v. California: Mandatory Venue in the Federal District of Intended Receipt, 58
B.U. L. REv. 79, 81 (1978), or possibly any place through which the material passes, see
United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 591 (5th Cir.)(Thornberry, J., dissenting), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); cf. United States v. Johnson, 323
U.S. 273, 274 (1944)(Congress may constitutionally make an act illegal in any federal
district through which the offending article is transported); Comment, Multi-Venue and
the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 416-18, 430-31 (1967)(obscenity as a
continuing offense may be prosecuted in any area through which the material passed).
But cf. Note, Postal Obscenity Prosecutions After Miller v. California: Mandatory
Venue in the Federal District of Intended Receipt, supra, at 79 (federal statute should
not be construed to permit such broad venue).
In addition to the difficulties engendered because the community may be large or undefined, two other considerations demonstrate that the jury cannot reasonably be expected to have accurate knowledge of prevailing community standards on obscenity. See
generally Brigman, supra note 17, at 539 (social science data demonstrate that neither
jury nor grand jury are representative of the community); U.S. CoMM'N ON OBSCENITY
AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT 354-57 (1970) (studies suggest that Americans tend to estimate prevailing sexual attitudes as more restrictive than they are in fact, and that little
consensus exists on what is offensive or prurient). First, jurors may well be ignorant of
attitudes held by members of the opposite sex. Studies show that men and women differ
in their experiences, attitudes, and views on the portrayal of sexual acts. See Wallace,
supra note 45, at 64; Wilson & Abelson, supra note 45, at 28, 32.
Second, jurors are likely to be ignorant of the scope of sexually explicit works available
in the community. Prosecutors, by using preemptory challenges, can exclude most jurors
familiar with relevant community standards on obscenity. Dennison, supra note 45, at
222; cf. United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial
judge "had very limited experience in determining what was pornographic, (little professionally and none personally)").
48. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Brigman, supra note 17, at 542; Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, supra
note 17, at 171-72.
49. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 479 (1966)(Black, J., dissenting);
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir.
1977) ("In reality, no judge or jury can be expected to determine 'community standards'
• . . . The best that anyone can do is give his or her personal reaction to it."), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965); In
re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 574, 446 P.2d 535, 543, 71 Cal. Rptr. 655, 663 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969); Fahringer, supra note 17, at 33; Shugrue & Zieg, supra note
8, at 165; Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, supra note 17, at 176.
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tional requirement that there be an objective assessment of a
work's relation to community norms.110 The difficulty - nigh impossibility - of the jury's task cannot be eased simply by placing the materials at issue into evidence. Those materials themselves communicate nothing about the community's views;
prevailing community standards necessarily are external to the
materials at issue and must be discovered through other evidence.111 Without such evidence of prevailing standards, courts
should rule that a critical element of an obscenity prosecution proof that the material in question transgresses community
standards regarding prurient interest and offensiveness - has
not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Community Standards and Compulsory Process
The sixth amendment112 affords the defendant in an obscenity
case the constitutional right to muster a defense and to present
evidence relevant to that defense.113 Given the significance of
community standards in determining obscenity/• evidence regarding those standards clearly will be relevant to the defendant's case in an obscenity prosecution. Because the right to produce a defense will thus include the right to demonstrate
prevailing community standards,115 the obscenity defendant has a
sixth amendment right to introduce comparison evidence bearing on those standards.
hi Hamling v. United States,116 however, the Supreme Court
dismissed as harmless any error arising from the exclusion of defendant's comparison exhibits, endorsing the lower courts' conclusion that the defendant had been fully able to present a de50. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974).
51. See United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 665 F.2d 666, 570 (9th Cir. 1977).
52. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 818-19 (1975); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972)(per curiam).
54. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting BrinkerhoffFaris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)).
56. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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fense through the' introduction of expert testimony regarding
community standards.117 The Court's analysis, though, failed to
recognize significant differences between the two types of evidence; comparison evidence may be far more effective than expert testimony in demonstrating prevailing community standards. The Court itself has noted that experts commonly are
inappropriate in obscenity cases, and indeed, often have made a
"mockery out of the otherwise sound concept ·of expert testimony. "118 Moreover, one researcher has found that jurors are
particularly likely to ignore the testimony of experts in obscenity trials. 119
Comparison evidence offers a substantial advantage over any
expert testimony: the comparison exhibits may be taken into the
jury room for examination at greater length and in greater detail. 80 Thus, the jury may draw its own conclusions from careful
evaluation of the comparison evidence, rather than having to
rely upon the testimony of an expert witness it may find incredible. If the right to fashion a defense to obscenity charges has
real substance, that right should not be limited to permitting the
obscenity defendant to use evidence which even the Court acknowledges is likely to be ineffective. Channelling the obscenity
defendant into the use of expert testimony rather than relevant
comparison evidence may seriously hamper the proof of contemporary community standards, thus impinging upon the constitutional right to present a defense.81

C.

Community Standards and Free Speech

Obscene materials may be prohibited, and its purveyors prosecuted, only because obscenity falls outside the protections of the
first amendment. 82 Nonobscene material, assuming it does not
fall within another category of unprotected speech,83 enjoys the
57. Id. at 127.
58. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); see Kehm v. United
States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 372-73, 192 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 (1971).
59. See McGafl'ey, supra note 17, at 221-32.
60. See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OP EvJDENCE § 217 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK].
61. See People v. Heller, 96 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 157 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833-34
(1979); Dennison, supra note 45, at 220.
62. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973); Roth v. United States, -354 U.S.
476, 485-87 (1957); accord, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).
63. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§12-8, at 602-08 (1978).
One commentator argues that the Supreme Court's isolation of obscenity as unprotected
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safeguards of two mechanisms devised by the Supreme Court to
ensure effectuation of first amendment rights. The first mechanism - the test for obscenity promulgated in Miller64 - embodies the Court's intent that only hard-core pornography, as
illustrated by various examples set forth in Miller, 811 would satisfy the three-prong obscenity test and thus be beyond first
amendment protection.
The allocation of responsibility for determining obscenity provides the second means for protecting the first amendment
rights of purveyors of sexually explicit material. Assessment of
whether a particular work is obscene involves a factual determination by the jury as to whether the work meets the legal definition66 of obscenity set forth in Miller. In the general case, such
factual findings by the jury are accorded conclusive effect by the
trial and appellate courts if supported by substantial evidence. 67
In contrast, because of the dangers of infringing upon the right
to free speech, the jury verdict in an obscenity case is not given
its usual conclusive effect.88 Rather, both the trial and appellate
courts must make independent reviews of the evidence to determine, as a factual matter, if the material at issue satisfies the
Miller test. 89
speech is correct because hard-core pornography is not speech but conduct - a surrogate for sexual acts. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity":
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
64. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
65. "Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals," or of "ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). Though a
later case held these examples to embody the constitutional limitations of hard-core pornography, see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), they are not meant to be an
exhaustive list. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974).
66. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1974).
67. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 13.8 (2d ed. 1977); 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 38.05, at nn.15-22 (2d ed. 1981).
68. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974); United States v. Cutting, 538
F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. A
Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968);
McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343,348 (Mo. 1975); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG,
supra note 8, at 847.
69. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
232 (1972)(per curiam); Penthouse Int'] Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1364 (5th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980). The plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964), suggests that the factual question whether a
particular work is obscene necessarily creates a companion first amendment question.
The power of appellate courts to consider matters of constitutional law de novo thus
implies an ability to investigate related matters of fact. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 25 (1973).
An unsettled question exists as to whether the appellate court must actually view the
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Meaningful independent review of the jury's factual findings,
however, cannot occur, especially at the appellate level, unless
independent evidence has been introduced regarding prevailing
community standards. The appellate court in an obscenity case
often will be far removed from the relevant community and
likely will have no ability to gauge community standards.70 If no
evidence is admitted at trial bearing on the content of prevailing
community standards, the record on appeal will be barren of any
definition of community norms.71 This seemingly presents an insuperable burden for the appellate court which must apply prevailing community standards when it independently reviews the
obscenity vel non of the material in question. The problem
presents itself at the trial level as well: one frustrated federal
district court found itself unable to adjudge material obscene
when no independent evidence had been introduced as to prevailing community standards.72 Although the Supreme Court has
yet to require the admission of evidence on community stanmaterial at issue to ensure that there is evidence sufficient to support the finding of
obscenity. In United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1978), for instance,
the Sixth Circuit noted that actual viewing of the material at issue would not always be
necessary in order for the court to make an independent review of the juey findings.
While the Supreme Court has not expressly required the appellate court to view the
material in question, see id. at 170-71 & n.6, such a requirement makes sense given the
Court's decisions in the first amendment area. The Court observed that application of
the Miller obscenity test would not abridge free speech rights because "the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately
protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25. The contours
of this independent review had been hinted at in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 231: "A
reviewing court must, of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well as its
content." A reviewing court in an obscenity case could hardly consider context and content, and review all the evidence, without viewing the material in question.
Appellate courts unquestionably have the power to view the material in question when
making an independent determination as to the obscenity of the work. See, e.g., Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (reversing the decision of the Georgia courts that the
movie Carnal Knowledge was obscene); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835,
840 {9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Womack, 509
F.2d 368, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); United States v. Hill,
500 F.2d 733, 738 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. A
Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Kaehler, 353 F. Supp. 476, 477 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
70. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 n.* (1977)(Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971).
72. See United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 569, 571 (9th Cir.
1977).
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dards, 73 lower courts should recognize that the additional layer
of factual review provided in obscenity cases becomes a hollow
means for safeguarding first amendment rights unless the record
contains independent evidence regarding prevailing community
norms on obscenity.
II.

ASSESSING THE RELEVANCY OF COMPARISON EVIDENCE

Comparison evidence proffered by the defendant purports to
demonstrate that the material in question does not transgress
community standards on sexual explicitness. Such evidence will
be relevant7 " and thus admissible75 whenever it bears upon determining whether the work at issue satisfies either of two factual prongs of the Miller test. 78 First, the comparison evidence
could tend to disprove the obscenity of the material in question
by showing that works like those at issue did not appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person applying contemporary
community standards.n Second, the. proffered comparison evidence might indicate that the putatively obscene material,
though perhaps having appeal to the prurient interest, was acceptable rather than offensive to the community.
Implicit in either theory of the proffer of comparison evidence
are the two foundation requirements for relevancy articulated in
United States v. Womack. 78 In order for comparison exhibits to
73. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 & n.6 (1973).
74. Relevancy is established whenever the proposition to be proved is more, or less,
probable with than without the proffered evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (relevancy
defined as "any tendency to make the existence of •.. the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence"); McCORMICK, supra note 60, § 185, at
437; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 32. Evidence need not by itself be dispositive of a
given iss~e in order to be relevant. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EvmENCE 140-41 (1977); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at §§ 28, 29, 32.
75. Evidence is admissible at trial only when relevant to an issue having legal significance. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 74, at 140-41;
1 J. W1GMORE, supra note 29, at § 12.
76. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
77. Such a demonstration would be relevant because material cannot be obscene unless it ~ppeals to the prurient interest. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487
(1957); notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
78. 509 F.2d 368, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); see cases
cited notes 30-31 supra.
The Womack court, in formulating its two-part relevancy test, distinguished the proffer of comparison evidence intended to demonstrate prevailing community standards
from the introduction of comparison exhibits either (1) to impeach a witness or (2) to
prove nonobscenity as a matter of law. See 509 F.2d at 374-82; Dennison, supra note 45,
at 212-13. This Article similarly limits its analysis to considering the proffer of comparison evidence as a means for showing contemporary community standards on obscenity.
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be considered relevant and therefore admissible, Womack reFor instances where courts have allowed comparison evidence to be introduced on
cross-examination for impeachDient purposes, see Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d
386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Matheny v.
State, 55 Ala. App. 119, 313 So. 2d 547 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 982 (1976). Some
courts, however, have not allowed the use of comparison evidence on cross-examination.
See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d at 380; State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 198 So.
2d 889 (1967), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); State v. Blair, 32
Ohio St. 2d 237, 291 N.E.2d 451 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905 (1973).
Because impeachment necessarily raises issues collateral to the trial, greater dangers of
conr.JSion or undue delay arise when comparison evidence is used to impeach rather than
to demonstrate community standards. Therefore, while the risk of confusion cannot justify the exclusion of comparison exhibits bearing upon contemporary community standards, see pt. ill infra, the use of comparison evidence for impeachment purposes should
be left to the discretion of the trial judge. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at
§ 464.

Where the obscenity defendant seeks to use comparison exhibits to demonstrate nonobscenity as a matter of law, there will be a proffer of material previously adjudicated
nonobscene. The Womack court noted that the trial judge properly could enter a judgment of acquittal - either on a motion to dismiss or a motion for acquittal - if the
material previously found nonobscene "equal[led] or exceed[ed]" the the sexual content
of works at issue. 509 F.2d at 374.
Obscenity becomes a question for the jury only when the judge finds the material to be
a patently offensive "hard core" portrayal of explicit sexual conduct, see note 65 supra,
proscribed by state law. E.g., NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 488-90, 489
P.2d 823, 828-29 (1971). Should the judge not find the material "hard core," the Miller
court made clear that the first amendment demands dismissal of the prosecution without
a full trial on the merits. See People v. Biocic, 80 m. App. 2d 65, 69, 224 N.E.2d 572, 575
(1967); People v. Austin, 76 Mich. App. 455, 463, 257 N.W.2d 120, 124 (1977). But see
United States .v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 213 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979):
"[R]arely is it argued with any force that the material in question is as a matter
of law not obscene, and that claim is not made here. One reason for this, we
suspect, is that where material has any remote relation to the values protected
by the obscenity tests, a generally tolerant society tolerates it in all events. A
second, more important reason, we suspect, is that the commercial marketability
of obscene materials depends in major part upon the very absence of those qualities which lift that material into the area of First Amendment protection."
In a civil proceeding where obscenity may be proved by a mere preponderance of the
evidence rather than by the reasonable doubt standard, the court may be less willing to
rule in the defendant's favor on the obscenity issue. See Dunn v. Maryland State Bd. of
Censors, 240 Md. 249, 254-56, 213 A.2d 751, 754-55 (1965)(in a civil proceeding denying a
license, judge cannot rule materials are nonobscene as a matter of law where the obscenity vel non is a disputed fact).
Although the court may rule that the defendant's material is nonobscene as a matter
of law, it never may find material obscene as a matter of law. To allow the court to
determine obscenity as a matter of law would be to deprive the defendant of confrontation and jury trial rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. See Hirsch & Ryan, I
Know It When I Seize It: Selected Problems in Obscenity, 4 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 9, 79-80
(1971).
Many cases have considered prior adjudicated material on a motion to dismiss or a
motion to acquit. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); United States v.
Palladino, 475 F.2d 65, 70-71 (1st Cir.}, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413
U.S. 916 (1973}; United States v. Hill, 473 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1972}; Huffman v. United
States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir.
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quires a threshold demonstration that the proffered evidence be
(1) similar to the material in question, and (2) acceptable to the
community.79 Without proof of similarity, the comparison evidence is not relevant to assessing whether the material at issue
offends contemporary community standards; without proof of
acceptability, the comparison exhibits are no more illustrative of
prevailing community attitudes toward sexually explicit materials than is the material in question.
While the Womack test for admissibility of comparison evidence appears clear on its face, application of the test has not
been easy. The concepts of similarity and acceptability were left
undefined in Womack and have entrusted considerable discretion in courts wrestling with the standards.80 Undefined standards for determining the relevancy of comparison exhibits,
though, present significant constitutional dangers. If the Womack test vests unbridled discretion in the trial court to pass on
the admissibility of comparison exhibits, evidentiary protections
for the due process and free speech rights of the obscenity defendant81 may be seriously compromised. Moreover, uncertainty
regarding the admissibility of comparison evidence creates
problems for the distributor of sexually explicit material who
will have trouble measuring what lies beyond prevailing community standards without knowing what illustrates those standards.
This raises the danger that constitutionally protected speech
will be chilled in order to avoid the uncertain risks of crimnal
1974); United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D.
Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 105,
447 P.2d 304, 311 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931, rev'd an writ of habeas carpus, 300
F. Supp. 650 (D. Or. 1969). Other courts have taken judicial notice of prior adjudications
to find obscenity defendants not guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Boltansky, 346 F.
Supp. 272, 276 (D. Md. 1972); Commonwealth v. LaLonde, 447 Pa. 364, 368-69, 288 A.2d
782, 784-85 (1972). For an example of an appellate court reversing a conviction due to
the existence of comparable materials already adjudicated nonobscene by the Supreme
Court, see Pinkus v. Pitchess, 429 F.2d 416, 417 (9th Cir.), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided court sub nam. California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S. 922 (1970).
79. . 509 F.2d at 377.
80. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 99 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Miller test "apparently requires an effort to distinguish between 'singles' and
'duals,' between 'erect penises' and 'semi-erect penises,' and between 'ongoing sexual activity' and 'imminent sexual activity'"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir.) (the
admissibility of comparison evidence "is a difficult area and the standards are ill defined"), cert. dismissed, 43~ U.S. 999 (1978); Dennison, supra note 45, at 216.
The courts also must often undertake the difficult task of defining the geographic
boundaries of the community. See note 47 supra.
81. See pt. I supra.
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liability. 82 As the following sections demonstrate, very few concrete standards can be derived from the courts' approaches to
assessing the similarity and acceptability of comparison
evidence.

A. The Acceptability of Comparison Evidence
Acceptability is not a self-defining concept; it could mean anything on a continuum from whole-hearted community approval
to indifferent toleration. At the very least, however, a community will be deemed not to accept material defined as obscene by
Miller; the test reflects at its core local community feelings regarding sexually explicit material. 83 Thus, as a, threshold matter,
comparison exhibits cannot be considered acceptable if obscene
under the Miller test.
Beyond this threshold determination, though, the means for
demonsti:ating acceptability become muddled. Defendants making a proffer of comparison exhibits commonly will argue either
(1) that the exhibits previously were adjudicated nonobscene
and so must be acceptable, or (2) that the exhibits are acceptable because widely available in the community.84
1. Comparison evidence previously adjudicated nonobscenesis_ Comparison exhibits which previously were the subject
of an obscenity prosecution resulting in acquittal will not always
be relevant to assessing the obscenity of other materials. 88 Even
assuming the similarity of the comparison evidence to the material at issue,87 the previous acquittal involving such evidence
does not necessarily show the extent of community acceptance
of sexually explicit material. The prior adjudication involving
the comparison exhibits, for instance, might have resulted in acquittal not because the exhibits were constitutionally protected
speech under the Miller test, but because other vital elements of
82. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
83. Protection of the quality of life and the total environment of the community constitutes a legitimate state justification for prohibiting obscenity. See Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 373 n.6, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975).
85. This section discusses the question of when material previously found nonobscene
may be given to the jury as evidence of community acceptability. A related issue whether materials already adjudicated nonobscene can be used to take the case from the
jury - is discussed at note 78 supra.
86. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-27 (1974); United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974).
87. See pt. Il B infra.
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the prosecution's case, such as scienter, were lacking.88
There will be many cases, however, where the record clearly
reflects that "the [work itself] was on trial."89 In such instances,
ample justification exists for concluding that the previously adjudicated materials are acceptable to the community: the community must accept what it cannot constitutionally prohibit.
Thus, in a subsequent obscenity defense, this previously _adjudicated material should be · admissible as comparison evidence
without any further demonstration of acceptability to the community. Principles of collateral estoppel90 should bar the prosecution - after failing previously to prove a lack of community
acceptance under the Miller test - from asserting that the proffered comparison exhibits are not acceptable to the community.
2. Comparison evidence widely available- The Supreme
Court observed in Hamling that the mere availability of comparison evidence does not necessarily demonstrate its acceptability.91 Rather, availability of comparison exhibits might show
"nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar
activities."92 At some point, however, a work widely available
must be considered inferentially acceptable. "The community
cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn
that which it generally tolerates."93 Thus, in Womack, the court
drew a distinction between comparison exhibits having "mere
88. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 180 (W.D. Mich.
1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom.
Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). A general verdict will not necessarily speak
to the obscenity vel non of the material in question. See, e.g., id.; Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959)(obscenity conviction reversed for lack of scienter); Walker v. State,
530 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
89. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 197, 233 A.2d 840, 845
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968); see Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966).
90. Issues actually litigated and necessarily decided will be binding in a subsequent
action, through principles of collateral estoppel, upon a party to the first action which
had the incentive and a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of
m. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Thus, when the state has failed in its attempt to
prove a particular work obscene in a case not decided upon peripheral issues, collateral
estoppel should. bar the state from subsequently reasserting that the work is obscene.
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (applying collateral estoppel in a criminal law
setting). See generally Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 78, at 76-81; Note, Subsequent Use of
Civil Adjudications of Obscenity, 13 TuLsA L.J. 146 (1977).
91. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (1974); see cases cited note 27 supra.
92. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 126 (quoting United States v. Manarite,
448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971)); see United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881, 882 (E.D. Wis. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 837 (1960).
93. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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availability," and those having a "reasonable degree of community acceptance. "H
To presume that available, sexually explicit material is acceptable and thus demonstrative of prevailing community standards
presupposes community awareness of the material. On this basis, the Womack court properly rejected defendants' proffer of
comparison exhibits purchased from suppliers in New York because the availability of these exhibits without more did not indicate community acceptance in the District of Columbia.915 Vast
elements of the community likely will have no knowledge of material available only outside the community; "such esoteric
materials purchased from a few vendors known only to those in
the trade with no general circulation are not probative on the
issue of contemporary community standards." 98 In contrast,
comparison exhibits have been admitted into evidence, for instance, when purchased nearby the federal courthouse housing
an obscenity trial.87
Another argument advanced to support the acceptability of
comparison exhibits is that sexually explicit and available material must be accepted if it has not been subject to prosecution
for violating obscenity statutes.98 In general, though, the lack of
prosecution cannot be taken as an accurate barometer of community acceptance. While the initiation of proceedings against a
particular work will tend to rebut an inference that the community accepts the work, the converse will not necessarily be true.
Public inertia in making complaints or the lack of prosecutorial
resources, rather than general acceptance, may account for the
unhindered presence of sexually explicit material in the community.88 The government's silence regarding a sexually oriented
94. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1022 (1975); see Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1966), rev'd
per curiam on other grounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967).
95. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d at 380.
96. Id.; see United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 197 n.27 (W.D.
Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub
nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d
584, 644, 512 P.2d 1049, 1083 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974).
97. United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D.
m. 1975).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 609 F.2d at 380; United States v. One Reel of
35mm Color Motion Picture Film, 491 F.2d 956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 201 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th
Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.
447 (1967).
99. Moreover, if the lack of criminal prosecution were deemed sufficient to establish
the acceptability of comparison evidence, the state could face a quandary in initiating a
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work will bear directly upon community acceptance only if the
obscenity defendant establishes that factors other than acceptability cannot explain the failure to prosecute.
The sales records of comparison exhibits are perhaps the best
evidence of their acceptability in the community. Sales figures
help indicate the local perception of works which, even though
available, are not necessarily accepted in the community. For instance, Larry Flynt, during his trial for distribution of obscene
materials, attempted to show the community acceptance of various proffered comparison exhibits by introducing into evidence
the distribution records for those exhibits. 100 The court, in rejecting the proffered exhibits, noted that Flynt could have
proven the acceptability of the comparison evidence if he had
introduced sales figures, but that distribution figures bore solely
upon availability. 101 Even had Flynt mustered sales records for
the comparison exhibits, however, he would have faced difficulties in showing community acceptance without proving that the
sales were distributed among a cross-section of the community.
If purchasers of the comparison exhibits were a distinct minority, or people from outside the community, or curiosity buyers,102 then even sales :figures might not establish acceptance.

B. The Similarity of Comparison Evidence
Determining whether a proffered comparison exhibit is similar
to the material at issue in an obscenity trial, for purposes of the
Womack relevancy test,1° 8 raises vexing problems. The critical
inquiry in assessing similarity will be the identification of significant differences between the comparison evidence and the putatively obscene material; " 'slight' variations in format may well
produce vastly different consequences in obscenity determinations. "10• The courts, however, have not always taken account of
prosecution against a distributor of sexually explicit material. A vendor charged for the
first time with distributing obscene material could proffer his wares, other than those at
issue, as comparison exhibits and claim them to be accepted by the community. See
State v. Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964} (defendant seller of sexually
explicit works argued that items in his store not seized as obscene were acceptable and
admissible as comparison evidence}.
100. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
101. Id.; see cases cited note 27 supra.
102. See United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1936} (refusing to permit
introduction of list of buyers of sexually explicit works, because even respectable people
may have a taste for salacity}.
103. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
104. United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1974}, cert. denied, 422
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the definition of obscenity when determining questions of similarity, and thus have failed to develop a consistent, logical approach tQ evaluating these "slight variations.ui 011
Comparison exhibits are introduced to show that the material
at issue does not transgress contemporary community standards
on obscenity. Thus, the inquiry into similarity should relate to
the definition of obscenity; comparison evidence should be assessed for its similarity to the material at issue with respect to
the three-part Miller test. 106 Comparison evidence which varies
from the material at issue only in ways not bearing upon the
obscenity determination should be considered similar and thus
admissible. 107
In general, though, the courts have not articulated in this
fashion their approach to assessing the similarity of comparison
evidence. While there may be good reason, for instance, to find
comparison evidence depicting "normal" heterosexual activity
different from putatively obscene material depicting "perverse"
activities such as sadomasochism or bestiality,1°8 dissimilarity
has been merely asserted without reference to underlying analysis under the Miller test. 109 Likewise, courts have found adult
heterosexual activity different from homosexual activity110 and
have distinguished "skin" magazines from marriage manuals or
medical textbooks. 111 In addition to questions of subject matter,
U.S. 1022 (1975).
105. Compare id. at 379 (holding that pictures of young boys in various sexual activities were not similar to pictures of adult heterosexual activity, erotically posed nude and
partially nude females, nude adult males, and young boys in nonerotic poses, nor to an
"illustrated version" of the Report of the President's Commission on Obscenity), with
Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.) (allowing a comparison of the Kinsey
Report with the material in question), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), and Flynt v.
State, 158 Ga. App. 232, 249-50, 264 S.E.2d 669, 675, 681 (Deen, C.J., concurring) (finding comparison evidence similar to the material in question, even though, unlike the
works at issue, the comparison exhibits did not combine heterosexual intercourse, scatology, bestiality, morbidity and violence, interracial sex, sadomasochism, child seduction,
lesbianism, heterosexual fellatio and cunnilingus), stay of enforcement denied, 446 U.S.
981 (1980).
106. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
107. This assumes, of course, that the acceptability of the comparison evidence has
been established. See pt. II A supra.
108. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977) (comparison
evidence was not similar because, unlike material at issue, it did not deal with sadobondage), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 293 (1978).
109. See, e.g., Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
110. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436· U.S. 293 (1978).
111. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 191 (W.D. Mich.
1964) (medical treatises, scientific treatises, marriage manuals, and "classics" not similar
to allegedly obscene books), a{f'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam on other
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proffered comparison evidence of a medium different from the
work at issue frequently has been found not similar and thus
inadmissible. Films have been distinguished from books -or
magazines, 111 live dance from other forms of expression,118 and
still photographs . from classic oil paintings, magazines, or
books. m At least one court has found comparison evidence dissimilar to the work in question on the basis of intended audience
and presentation, rejecting the proffer of a comparison between
a sex education slide show and the movie Deep Throat. 1111
In many instances, valid justifications grounded in the Miller
test may be developed to support the distinctions drawn by the
courts. For example, "skin" magazines or explicit photographs
safely can be found dissimilar to classical oil paintings, marriage
manuals, or medical textbooks on the basis of social value of the
works. A failure to articulate such a rationale, though, may raise
problems in close cases. Social value is a concept susceptible of
distortion. Thus, it requires careful examination whenever the
proffered comparison evidence differs from the material in question on that basis - "what is pornography for one man is the
laughter of genius to another."118
As another example, distinctions between comparison exhibits
and putatively obscene material based upon the age, gender, and
activities of the participants probably reflect an emphasis upon
similarity in terms of offensiveness and appeal to the prurient
interest. Yet human sexual activity can take almost infinitely variable forms, with different effect upon the target audience or
grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Gower,
316 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D.D.C. 1970) (instructive manuals distinguished from pictures
because manuals might have social value), uacated and remanded on other grounds, 413
U.S. 914 (1973).
112. See United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977), reu'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); People v. Bloss, 18 Mich. App. 410, 416, 171 N.W.2d 455,
458 (1969), reu'd on other grounds, 402 U.S. 938 (1971).
113. See State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 368, 373, 192 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1971)(live dancing show, books, and magazines not similar to a film). But see In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d
563, 566-67, 446 P.2d 535, 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1968) (films and magazines were
admitted to demonstrate the acceptability of a live dance), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910
(1969).
114. See Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 859 (1961); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich.
1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), reu'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom.
Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. One Unbound Volume, 128
F. Supp. 280 (D. Md. 1955)(books on archeological artifacts not similar to pictures intended for display even though the pictures concerned the same artifacts).
115. See United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir. 1981).
116. United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965)(quoting D.H. LAWRENCE,
Pornography and Obscenity, in SEX LITERATURE AND CENSORSHIP 69 (H. Moore ed.
1953)).
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the general public. If courts do not engage in critical reasoning,
they run the risk of substituting visceral reactions for reasoned
decisions when assessing whether proffered comparison exhibits
are similar to the material at issue in terms of offensiveness or
appeal to the prurient interest. 117

C. Requiring the Trial Court to Make Written Relevancy
Determinations
The foregoing discussion amply demonstrates the difficulties
involved in establishing the relevancy of comparison evidence.
Yet these difficulties do not justify perfunctory exclusion of
comparison evidence; rather, they only illustrate the obstacles
facing the defendant attempting to show the nonobscenity of
sexually explicit materials. H the difficulty of introducing relevant comparison evidence warrants its exclusioll, the obscenity
defendant may lose his only avenue for proving prevailing community standards - and thus the only avenue for vindicating
his constitutional rights.
The obstacles involved in adducing relevant proof of community standards should induce caution among courts excluding
comparison exhibits and should encourage diligence among appellate courts reviewing such evidentiary exclusions. This goal
can be realized only by requiring trial courts to articulate reasons for adjudging comparison evidence not relevant. Appellate
courts cannot possibly review evidentiary rulings on comparison
evidence made by the 'trial court unless there is a clear delineation of the reasoning. If the trial court makes explicit findings,
on appeal there can be a determination whether the rulings on
comparison evidence were clearly erroneous,118 and the appellant
challenging the exclusion of comparison exhibits will have a
more realistic opportunity to prove an abuse of discretion. 119 To
117. The approach taken in Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974), exemplifies the problems that can
arise when the similarity of comparison exhibits is evaluated without reference to the
underlying constitutional standards. Applying the Roth-Memoirs test, see note 7 supra,
the court found proffered comparison evidence depicting one model dissimilar to putatively obscene material showing more than one person, 470 F.2d at 403, reasoning that
pictures of two or more models presented a greater likelihood of depicting sexual activity, id. at 401. Similarity should depend, however, not upon the likelihood of portraying
objectionable sexual activity, but rather whether there actually is sexually explicit material transgressing the bounds of constitutionally protected speech.
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 67, at§ 13.8.
119. In Hamling, the defendants lost their evidentiary arguments on appeal because
they had failed to prove the trial court abused its discretion. See Hamling v. United
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enable effective appellate review of decisions to exclude comparison evidence, and to maximize the protection of the obscenity
defendant's constitutional rights to free speech and due process,
the trial court should be required to determine in writing
whether proffered comparison evidence was shown to be similar
to the materials in question and acceptable to the community.120
0

III. THE

RISK OF CONFUSION AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
EXCLlJDING RELEVANT COMPARISON EVIDENCE

As a general principle, relevant evidence may be excluded
when its introduction would cause confusion by entangling the
jury in collateral issues raised by the evidence. 1111 In Hamling v.
United States, 1211 the Supreme Court applied this general rule in
endorsing the risk of jury confusion as a valid reason for excluding relevant comparison evidence in an obscenity trial. 123 Of necessity, comparison evidence raises issues not involved diI'.ectly
States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-26 (1974).
. 120. Cf. Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.) (damages awarded by trial court without jury must be supported by factual findings so appellate court can review for error), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
121. More precisely, relevant evidence may be excluded if it confuses or misleads the
jury, creates unfair surprise, unfairly prejudices one party, wastes time and causes delay,
or needlessly presents cumulative evidence. See FBI>. R. Evm. 403; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 29, at § 29a. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 443(2).
Risk of confusion is the most salient reason for excluding sexually explicit comparison
exhibits; the other factors commonly cited to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence
have little weight in obscenity trials. First, comparison evidence should never be excluded because of the risk of unfair surprise. The prosecution should readily anticipate a
proffer of evidence on community standards in an obscenity trial, and to the extent that
the prosecution needs time to address the particular evidence proffered, a continuance
rather than exclusion of the evidence would cure the problem. Second, comparison evidence should never be excluded due to the risk of prejudice. Unfair prejudice arises when
the evidence tends to induce the jury to use an improper basis of decision. See FBo. R.
Evm. 403, Advisory Committee Note; McCORMICK, supra note 60, § 185, at 439 & n.31.
In contrast, comparison evidence will not encourage improper deliberations but will direct the jury to decide on the basis of community standards concerning sexually explicit
materials, even if it finds those standards loathsome. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29,
at § 1159 (arguing that jurors' sensitivities should not prevent the presentation of the
necessary parts of a defense). Even should the jury's disgust at the comparison exhibits
work against the defendant, the evidence should be admissible - after all, the defendant
has introduced the evidence. Finally, because of the unique characteristics of comparison
evidence, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra, it should never be considered
cumulative with expert testimony on community standards. While the concern for avoiding cumulative evidence may be a valid reason for limiting the number of comparison
exhibits, see cases cited note 28 supra, it should not be used to exclude those exhibits
altogether.
122. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
123. Id. at 127.
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in the trial of the purveyor of sexually explicit material. Even
though the judge has found the evide\lce admissible, the jury
still must apply the Womack test independently, deciding
whether the comparison evidence truly reflects community standards, and whether the comparison exhibit is comparable to the
material at issue.
Although comparison evidence raises more questions for the
jury and thereby complicates the trial in one sense, it should not
be considered a source of jury confusion. In fact, comparison evidence clarifies matters for the jury by providing concrete illustration of contemporary community standards with respect to
.sexually explicit materials - standards that the jury must evaluate under the Miller definition of obscenity. If the jury is capable, as the Court assumes, of applying community standards to
determine obscenity without any evidence of those standards,
then surely the jury can assess the proper weight to be given
comparison exhibits without becoming unduly confused;124 the
jury commonly must assess the weight of relevant evidence.
If, on the other hand, the jury cannot be presumed to have
independent knowledge of community standards, as this Article
concludes,1211 it may not be able to assess whether comparison
exhibits accurately reflect those standards. This presents the
risk that the jury will rely on comparison exhibits which do not
accurately reflect prevailing community attitudes on sexually explicit material.
This risk should not be avoided, however, by excluding relevant comparison evidence. Exclusion of such evidence maximizes
the likelihood that the jury, having no evidence of community
standards, will merely apply its own prejudices in making an obscenity determination. The response to the jury's inability to
fully weigh the force of comparison evidence should not be to
cast the jury further into the dark. Although introducing comparison exhibits may tend to benefit the purveyor of obscene
materials along with the person exercising a legitimate right to
free speech, the criminal law dictates implicitly that it is preferable to allow a guilty person to go free than to convict an innocent person exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The risk of inaccurate jury evaluation of comparison evidence
should be checked through careful, diligent use of the Womack
relevancy test. If the foundation requirements of similarity and
acceptability have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the
124. See Dennison, supra note 45, at 217.
125. See pt. I A supra.
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court, there exists little danger of improper jury reliance. Indeed, comparison evidence found relevant under Womack likely
does reflect prevailing community standards. The jury remains
free to disregard the evidence,128 and the prosecution can attack
the probative value of the exhibits. The defendant who succeeds,
however, in overcoming the sizable hurdles involved in demonstrating the similarity and acceptability of comparison evidence
should not be thwarted by the risk of jury confusion. Under this
approach, if comparison evidence satisfies the Womack test, its
exclusion on the basis of possible jury confusion should be considered an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

Although the concept of community standards lies at the core
of the definition of obscenity, a jury cannot reasonably be expected to have an accurate perception of those standards. Thus,
proof of community standards is critical to protecting the due
process and free speech rights of the obscenity defendant, and
comparison evidence, as a uniquely effective way of presenting
those standards, may be essential to an adequate defense against
obscenity charges.
Assessing the relevancy of comparison evidence necessitates
troublesome determinations as to community acceptability and
similarity between the proffered evidence and the work in question. But the difficulty does not stem from the proffer of comparison evidence; such evidence merely forces the jury to repeat
questions that must be asked about the material in question.
Rather, confusion stems from the definition of obscenity and its
reliance upon community standards as a dividing line between
protected and unprotected speech. The vast difficulties involved
in showing the relevancy of comparison evidence suggest the
near impossibility of determining in advance whether a particular work is obscene. The purveyor of sexually explicit works who
thus must await a case-by-case assessment of obscenity either
suffers a chilling of potentially protected speech or risks conviction under standards not easily subject to proof at trial.
Such post-hoc determinations of obscenity hardly constitute
adequate protection for the defendant's constitutional rights to
126. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974) (jury was free to disregard
expert testimony on community standards).
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free speech and due process.127 Given the dilemma confronting
the purveyor of sexually explicit material, relevant comparison
evidence should be admitted even if it brings increased complexity to the trial; to err on the side of inclusion is to give the defendant a fighting chance.

127. See Ford v. State, 394 N.E.2d 250, 258 {Ind. App. 1979) (Garrand, J., dissenting)
(the standards on obscenity "create a community of the twelve seated in the box and
permit their standards to largely determine ex post facto whether material is obscene");
Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of
an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1978). But see Comment, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (1978)
(advocating retention of community standards concept in order to limit the power of
trial judges and to leave obscenity determinations to the jury).

